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OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent;
Case No.
vs.
DAVID E. REYNOLDS,
Defendant-Appellant.

13680

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF T H E NATURE
OF T H E CASE
The appellant, David E. Reynolds, appeals from a
jury verdict of guilty of unlawful distribution for value
of a controlled substance in the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN T H E LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty by a jury of unDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lawful distribution for value of a controlled substance in
the Third Judicial District Court on February 20, 1974.
Appellant was then sentenced to the Utah State
Prison for the indeterminate term as provided by law
on March 19, 1974, by the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge.
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
The respondent respectfully submits that the jury
verdict of guilty in the Court below should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In September, 1973, Salt Lake County Deputy
Sheriff Ralph R. Tolman was approached by Scott
Helmsin, who stated that he wished to work with Tolman as his agent to help him in the purchasing of a controlled substance from David Reynolds, the appellant
(T. 80-81). Officer Tolman told Helmsin that if he
could deal with someone to set up a buy and then contact him and they would make the buy together (T. 82).
On October 11, 1973, Helmsin called Officer Tolman
and told him that they should be able to find the appellant that evening (T. 83).
At approximately 8:55 p.m., on October 11, 1973,
Officer Tolman, along with Helmsin and Deputy
Sheriff Jim Duncan drove to an apartment complex
in Salt Lake County where they met the appellant
(T. 83, 85). Helmsin asked the appellant if he could
get Speed (T. 86). Appellant replied, "How many?"
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and Officer Tolman responded by saying, "A hundred," and the appellant said "All right." (T. 87, 90).
Officer Tolman then asked the price and appellant
said, "twenty dollars." (T. 90). When Officer Tolman
complained about the price, appellant said, "That's the
price if you want them." (T. 91). Officer Tolman then
gave appellant twenty dollars and appellant said he
would be back in about ten minutes (T. 91, 93). Appellant returned at 9:10 p.m., and Officer Tolman approached his truck on the driver's side (T. 93, 94).
Appellant handed a little package to Helmsin who in
turn handed it to Officer Tolman (T. 94). Officer
Tolman immediately placed the package, containing
approximately one hundred tablets in an evidence envelope. On November 9, 1973, a laboratory anaylsis of
the tablets disclosed that they were amphetamine (T.
125-126).
Appellant was arrested on a warrant for unlawful
distribution for value of a controlled substance on November 7, 1973 (T. 5, 115). On November 8, 1973,
Mr. Don L Bybee represented the defendant in a hearing for a bond reduction and was successful in convincing the court to reduce appellant's bond to $2,000 (T.
4). Mr. Bybee then represented the appellant at a hearing before the Honorable Joseph G. Peppson, to determine whether or not there was entrapment leading to
appellant's arrest (T. 52). The court found there was
not sufficient evidence to find any entrapment (T. 67).
Mr. Bybee was also retained by the appellant to
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represent him at his trial on February 19 and 20, 1974
(T. 72). After conducting a vigorous and extensive
defense of the appellant, Mr. Bybee withdrew his requested jury instructions which he had submitted to
this Court, because he and the appellant felt they were
substantially covered by the Court's instructions (T.
226). After the jury found the appellant guilty of unlawful distribution for value of a controlled substance
(T. 228), Mr. Bybee made a motion for a verdict of
not guilty notwithstanding the verdict of the jury,
which the Court denied (T. 231). After the verdict,
Mr. Bybee was successful in persuading the Court to
allow the appellant to remain free on bond until his
sentencing appearance (T. 231).
Mr. Bybee next represented the appellant at his
sentencing hearing on March 19, 1974, at which time
the appellant was sentenced for the indeterminate term
as provided by law (T. 45). On April 22, 1974, Mr.
Bybee filed a timely notice of appeal on behalf of the
Appellant (T. 46). Mr. Bybee petitioned the Court
on May 17, 1974, to allow him to withdraw as attorney
for the appellant in this appeal inasmuch as the appellant has been unable to pay attorney's fees involved in
his defense (T. 48).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT RECEIVED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT
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A L L STAGES OF T H E CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM.
The right to effective or adequate assistance of
counsel was enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55,
72 L.Ed. 158 (1932), which held that failure to make an
effective appointment of counsel violates the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and is a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Utah Supreme Court announced a similar
view in State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 887
(1957), holding that the privilege of an accused to the
assistance of counsel is one of the fundamental rights,
meaning the assistance of a reputable member of the bar
who is willing and in a position to honestly and conscientiously represent the interest of the defendant. I n
Alires v. Turner, 22 Uah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969),
the Utah Supreme Court stated the requirements consistituting "effective counsel":
"The requirement is not satisfied by a
sham or pretense of an appearance in the record by an attorney who manifests no real concern about the interests of the accused. The
entitlement is to the assistance of a competent
member of the Bar, who shows a willingness
to identify himself with the interests of the
defendant and present such defenses as are
available to him under the law and consistent
with the ethics of the profession." 449 P.2d
at 243.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
The record is replete with examples that appellant's retained counsel, Mr. Don L. Bybee, had a real
and sincere concern about the interests of his client and
conducted his defense in a professional and commendable manner using a variety of legal skills. Mr. Bybee
was successful in convincing the court to lower the appellant's bond when he was arrested so he could be free
until the trial (T. 4). Mr. Bybee recognized the possible defense of entrapment and presented a well-prepared attack at the entrapment hearing (T. 52). A t
the trial itself, Mr. Bybee appeared to raise every objection which was available to him. Upon cross-examination of the State's witnesses, he skillfully attacked
their memory of the events on the night of the drug
sale and attempted to use the testimonies of these adverse witnesses to establish possible defenses for the
actions of his client. Mr. Bybee called a female acquaintance of the appellant, who provided evidence of
entrapment favorable to the defense (T. 140). Finally,
defense counsel called the appellant as a witness and
carefully and skillfully established his defense through
his client's own words (T. 162).
After the jury had returned a verdict of guilty,
defense counsel still expressed a concern for the interests
of his client. Mr. Bybee used the wise tactic of a motion
for a verdict of not guilty notwithstanding the verdict
of the jury (T. 231); he persuaded the Court to allow
the appellant to remain on bond until his sentencing
(T. 231) ; he represented the appellant at his sentencing
(T. 45); and he then filed a timely notice of appeal
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from the conviction (T. 46). Mr. Bybee withdrew as
appellant's attorney on the appeal only when it appeared
that the appellant would not even be able to pay for the
expense accrued during his previous defense (T. 48).
The total sum of these acts indicates the appellant
was represented by a capable attorney who was well
versed in the facts of the case, interested in the future
of his client, and presented a defense in a conscientious
and adequate manner. The appellant received effective
counsel, which does not mean errorless counsel, and not
counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. United States v. Fruge, 495 F,2d 557 (5th
Cir. 1974).
POINT II
T H E M E R E F A I L U R E TO R E G U E S T A
SPECIFIC JURY INSTRUCTION DOES
N O T A M O U N T TO A D E N I A L O F E F F E C T I V E ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Appellant contends that he did not receive effective
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to present his case in a fundamental respect in that he failed
to request a specific jury instruction. Appellant's Brief
at 6.
In Andreason v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 182, 493 P.2d
1278 (1972), the petitioner in an appeal from a denial
of his writ of habeas corpus contended that he was denied
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effective counsel because his attorney failed to request
an instruction on alibi. In disposing of the contention
the Utah Supreme Court said:
"His [defense counsel] omission of a
request for an instruction on alibi may have
been an oversight or a matter of strategy after
evaluating the testimony of the alibi witnesses.
Nevertheless, a review of the record negates
a conclusion, as expressed by plaintiff, that
defense counsel's presentation was tantamount
to a sham or pretense of an appearance in the
record with no real concern about the interests
of his client." 493 P.2d at 1280.
The record indicates that appellant's counsel was
well aware of the instructions that were presented to
the jury. When asked by the Court if he had any exceptions to the instructions, the following response
followed:
MR. B Y B E E : Thank you. For the record,
the defendant, David Reynolds, withdraws the
requested instructions which we have submitted
to the Court because we believe that they are
substantially covered by the Court's instructions. (T. 226).
Mr. Bybee then proceeded to take exception to two of
the instructions presented by the Court (T. 226). I t
is possible that Mr. Bybee was well aware there was no
instruction on the issue whether or not Mr. Reynolds

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
was acting as an agent of the police in obtaining a controlled substance, but omitted it because of his overall
trial strategy.
I t is an established rule in many jurisdictions that
counsel is not to be second-guessed on matter of judgment or trial strategy and even mistakes and an unfavorable result does not, by itself, amount to a denial of
effective assistance of counsel. Application of Lomich,
221 F.Supp. 500 (D.C. Mont. 1936); United States v.
Cariola, 211 F.Supp. 423 (D.C.N.J. 1962); United
States ex rel, Blolth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.
1963); Kapsalis v. United States, 345 F.2d 392 (7th
Cir. 1965). Mistakes of counsel or trial strategy that
backfires does not amount to a denial of due process
unless on the whole the representation is of such low
caliber as to be equivalent to no representation at all,
and to reduce the proceedings to a farce or a sham.
People v. Hinton, 132 IU.2d 409, 270 N.E.2d 93
(1971); Kapsalis v. United States, supra.
Respondent also contends that the fact petitioner
retained his own counsel ought to be fatal to his allegation. Courts have often attached some significance
to whether the attorney was privately retained or courtappointed in determining whether relief should be granted. I n Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959),
the court said:
" I t has been repeatedly held that in cases
of counsel selected by the defendant, the com-
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mission of what retroactively may appear to be
errors of judgment on the part of the attorney
does not constitute a constitutional lack of due
process. . ." Id. at 842.
In Popeko v. United States, 294 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.
1961), cert. den. 374 U.S. 835, 83 S.Ct. 1883, 10 L.Ed.
2d 1056 (1963), the privately retained trial attorney
failed to call defendant's witnesses and the Court said:
". . . we think it basic to the claim of relief, since defendants were represented by their
own employed trial counsel, that they may not
assign as error that the mistakes or errors of
their counsel constitued an unfair trial. . . . "
Id. at 171.
Respondent submits that on appeal, this Court
should take cognizance of the presumption that the appellant's rights were safeguarded by the trial court, and
that the defense counsel faithfully performed his duty
to protect the rights of his client. See Busby v. Holman,
356 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1966). I t then becomes incumbent upon the appellant to prove his right to relief by
showing the incompetency of his counsel. Such a burden
is a heavy one and relief is granted only in extreme
cases where counsel has been so grossly ineffective as
to constitute no representation at all, or a farce, sham,
or pretense. Respondent contends that this burden of
proof has not been met by appellant and the decisions
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and strategy of his trial counsel were made in his best
interest.
This Court in Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19,
465 P.2d 343 (1970), warned that many guilty men
have escaped their punishments from the law through
the loophole of claiming inadequate representation of
counsel, and that lawabiding citizens would suffer unless courts look more carefully at the requirements for
effective counsel as set forth in the constitution. I n a
reaff irmance of this view, Mr. Justice Crockett recently
stated in State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d
1313 (1974), the following compelling logic:
"In regard to the defendant's contention
that he was denied effective counsel: we are
implied to remark that it is nothing less than
shameful that our law seems to have degenerated to a point where whenever an accused
is convicted of crime, the charge of incompetency of counsel is, with ever increasing frequency, leveled at capable attorneys who have
given entirely adequate service, when the real
difficulty was that he had a guilty client. I n
this respect also defendant had his entitlement
of adequate representation by capable and conscientious counsel." 517 P.2d at 1315
CONCLUSION
Respondent contends that based upon the foregoing reasons, appellant was afforded the effective assistance of counsel by a capable and conscientious at-
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torney and any possible error by defense counsel did
not amount to a denial of due process. The respondent,
therefore, requests that the judgment below be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
V E R N O N B. R O M N E Y
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for

Respondents
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